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GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF
FOOD MARKETING TO CHILDREN:
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND
THE KID-VID CONTROVERSY
Tracy Westen*
In a rulemaking proceeding subsequently called the most radical
agency initiative every conceived, in 1978 the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) proposed sweeping regulations to restrict
television advertising to children.' I was put in charge of developing
this rule-making proceeding.
The FTC first proposed to ban all television advertising to
children who were too young to understand the selling intent of
commercials, on the theory that such ads were unfair and deceptive.
2
Second, for older kids, roughly eight to eleven, we proposed to ban
all television advertising for highly sugared products, such as candies
that caused dental risks, on the theory that, although kids know
they're being advertised to, they lack the ability to understand long-
term serious health consequences-they can't balance the desire for
immediate gratification versus the hazards of tooth decay. And third,
for older kids-eight to eleven and older-with respect to sugared
products like soft drinks that have long-term adverse nutritional
consequences but not necessarily tooth decay, we proposed to require
either in-ad disclosures warning purchasers' kids of the nutritional
consequences, or full counter-ads-public service announcements
CEO, Center for Governmental Studies, and former Deputy Director for
Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission. This Article is adapted
from oral remarks made at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
Symposium: Food Marketing to Children and the Law (Oct. 21, 2005) (video
recording available at http://av.lls.edu/ramgen/programs/foodmktg/rv-kp-
keynote.rm).
1. Children's Advertising, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,967 (Apr. 27, 1978) (codified
at 14 C.F.R. pt. 369).
2. Id. at 17,969.
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opposing consumption of those products paid for by the advertisers
of those products.
We also made other proposals in the same rule-making
proceeding-to limit selling techniques such as host selling, to limit
certain messages like "sugar is fun," to reduce the number of ads in
children's programming, to require in-ad disclosure such as "sugar
can rot your teeth"-but those received less attention than the three
major ones.
Three years later, in 1981, the FTC terminated this rule-making
proceeding without taking any action.3  The proceeding had
witnessed enormous controversy. Although the FTC ended the
proceeding, the staff left behind a lengthy report summarizing what
was learned, including 60,000 pages of expert testimony and 6,000
pages of oral testimony from some of the leading experts on health,
children psychology and nutrition in the world.4
The staffs 1981 report, which is part of the public record,
concluded that the evidence received had established that very young
children are cognitively unable to understand the selling intent of
ads5. In my opinion, that inevitably led to the conclusion that very
young children are deceived by advertising. The staff document left
a factual predicate by summarizing everything that was learned, for
future efforts at regulation, and it is sitting there today still waiting to
be used. What I want to do today is briefly describe what happened,
and what lessons might be learned from this rule-making proceeding.
In 1977, what the FTC knew about the problems posed by
children's television advertising is roughly as follows: We knew that
children watched a lot of television-kids two to eleven watched
about twenty-five hours a week, preschoolers thirty-three hours a
week, or one-third of their waking hours. We also knew that adults
watched four hours a day on average, or ten solid years of twenty-
four-hour days watching television, by the age of sixty-five. 6 Today,
3. Children's Advertising, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,710, 48,712 (Oct. 2, 1981)
(codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 461).
4. FTC, FINAL STAFF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, IN THE MATTER
OF CHILDREN'S ADVERTISING (1981).
5. See Children's Advertising, 46 Fed. Reg. at 48,712 (noting that the
Staff Report concluded that children six years and under place indiscriminate
trust in television advertising messages and do not understand the persuasive
bias inherent in advertising).
6. FTC, STAFF REPORT ON TELEVISION ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN 51
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it's even more.
Kids saw at least 20,000 commercial television ads a year,7 and
there was already evidence that they couldn't distinguish between
commercials and programs. 8 Psychologists, some of the leading
ones, said that very young children, ages three, four, or five, thought
that the characters were real, and that they lived inside the television
set.
9
One psychologist said it's very hard to capture how a young
child views a commercial, but gave this example: To a very young
child, a Tony theiTiger commercial came across as follows: "Hi, I'm
Tony the Tiger, and I love you. I'm your friend, and I want you to eat
Sugar Frosted Flakes because I want you to grow up to be big and
strong like me." That was the message received by very young
children.
The average commercial in those days cost about $35,000 to
produce. That's pretty cheap by today's standards, but we calculated
that each exposure was a $35,000 experience. On that basis, from
the age of two to eleven, the average child received about $7 billion
in sophisticated educational TV ad experiences.
We also knew there were lots of ads for sugared products-kids
saw 7000 ads for sugar a year-and that posed special problems.'
0
We knew that by the age of two, half the children in this country had
gum disease and one decayed tooth; by the age of eighteen, the
average child had fourteen decayed teeth; I yet half of all fifteen
year-olds never saw a dentist. 12 Pediatricians told us tooth decay was
the number one childhood illness at that time. We also knew that
older children knew very little about nutrition, and we speculated
that television ads were shaping their nutritional attitudes.
Of course, we also knew that western legal tradition has always
given children special treatment. The Code of Hammurabi, written
on stone tablets 2200 years before Christ, 13 prohibited entering into
(1978).
7. Id. at 13, 53.
8. Id. at 15.
9. Id. at 15, 83-84.
10. Id. at 57.
11. Id. at 111.
12. See id. at 113 (indicating that less than half of the population visits a
dentist in any given year).
13. Id. at 210 n.313 (citing F. Woodbridge, Physical and Mental Infancy in
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contracts with children. 14  Today the law of attractive nuisance
requires you put a fence around your swimming pool so
unsupervised kids won't be attracted to the water and drown.
5
Contracts with minors are voidable. 16 State laws limit the ages that
minors can marry and work. 7 Even the U.S. Constitution specifies
that you can't run for federal office or vote in federal elections unless
you're a certain age. So we knew that there were core legal
traditions that gave children special protections because they have
less maturity, less cognitive experience in the world.
We also knew that the FTC could only act if it first found
actions that were either unfair or deceptive; only then could it devise
a remedy.1 8 Under FTC precedents, deception is not only saying
something that's untrue, but it's also omitting something that's very
important-deception by omission.' 9  Some old FTC cases, for
example, prohibited actors dressed in white coats with stethoscopes
around their necks from selling products, because that created the
assumption that doctors were recommending the product when in
fact they weren't, paid actors were. So omitting an important fact,
namely, that doctors don't necessarily recommend this product, was
also considered to be deceptive.
In addition, there was a strong policy against so-called sublim-
inal advertising. At the time these ads were thought to include
implanted messages that would go by so quickly you wouldn't
consciously be aware of them, but in fact they would affect you
psychologically. (It turned out later that subliminal ads were a
hoax.) The FTC and Congress were very concerned about
subliminal ads and felt that they embodied a fundamental form of
deception. Ads that bypassed your cognitive defenses were
the Criminal Law, 87 U. PA. L. REv. 428 (1939)) (explaining that under the
Code of Hammurabi (c. 2250 B.C.), buying or receiving on deposit anything
from a minor without power of attorney or consent of elders was a crime
punishable by death).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 207-09 (summarizing the attractive nuisance doctrine and citing
relevant cases and treatises).
16. Id. at 210-211 (summarizing case law and treatises on the voidability of
contracts involving minors).
17. Id. at 216-17.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1975).
19. See FTC, supra note 6, at 158-64 (describing the FTC Act and relevant
case law).
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considered deceptive. We based the children's rule-making on that
conclusion, starting with the assumption that if children could not
understand the difference between an ad and a program, could not
understand the selling intent of an ad, did not know they were being
advertised to, then fundamentally they were being deceived. That
was a key legal basis of the original proposal.2 °
Three years later, the rulemaking proceeding was shut down for
both political and substantive reasons. First, the political climate had
changed. In the mid-1970s, when we were gearing up for this, the
country was very pro-consumer. "Consumer protection" and "the
public interest" were well-known watch words. Ralph Nader was in
his heyday. Congress almost created an agency for consumer
representation-a federal agency designed to represent consumers in
all litigation across the federal government in consumer issues. The
proposal was ultimately defeated.
But by the late 70s, that began to change. Inflation was
rampant; stagnation in the economy began to spark opposition to
consumer legislation; and corporations developed rhetorical rebuttals
to "public interest" arguments, warning of "excessive governmental
regulation." Lobbying innovations were created. The industries that
opposed the children's television rulemaking raised $16 million in
contributions to oppose it. That may not seem like much right now,
but that was an amount one-fourth the entire FTC's budget. No one
had ever raised that much money to oppose an agency rule-making
proceeding. And, of course, campaign contributions to Congressmen
grew.
During the FTC's three-year rulemaking period, the FTC was
called a "National Nanny" by the Washington Post.2 1 The rhetoric
stuck. The FTC was ordered by Congress not to adopt any rules
without first posting them in writing. The U.S. District found
Chairman Pertschuk guilty of "bias" for delivering a candid speech
about the problems of children's TV advertising and disqualified him
from participating in the proceeding, but the U.S. Court of Appeals
20. See id. at 221-28 (arguing that it is inherently unfair and deceptive to
address any television advertisement to children too young to understand the
selling purpose of the advertisement).
21. Editorial, Farewell to the National Nanny, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 1981,
at A14; Merrill Brown, New Head at FTC, New Era for Kid Ads, WASH. POST,
Oct. 1, 1981, at Dll.
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reversed, holding that Pertschuk had merely been informing the
public about an important agency proceeding. 22  Nevertheless,
Pertschuk subsequently disqualified himself just to make sure the
proceeding appeared fair.23 That left only four votes. We were then
told by Congress we could not adopt any rules based on the FTC's
unfairness jurisdiction.24 That took away half of our jurisdiction.
Congress then passed legislation allowing both Houses of Congress
to veto any act of a regulatory agency,25 and it took several years of
litigation to the U.S. Supreme Court to reverse that.26
Finally, in 1980, President Regan was elected. He appointed a
new FTC chairman,27 and it was apparent that the new chairman was
opposed to the proceeding. So by March of 1981 it was clear the
proceeding was doomed, there were no longer sufficient votes for it.
At that point the staff decided to write a document memorializing
what had been learned, if you like a kind of a message in a bottle to
future public interest advocates interested in doing something about
children's advertising. That document summarized everything we
learned, the pros and cons, all of the testimony. There are still today
60,000 pages of expert testimony sitting there to be mined for
whatever projects you might be interested in using it for. So I
suggest you take a look at it; we left it there deliberately.
As the staff report explains, we encountered difficult substantive
problems in the proceeding. The first proposal was to ban all adver-
tising to kids who were too young to understand what an ad was,
who didn't know they were being advertised to. What did we
conclude? The FTC staff report concludes that the problem did exist,
22. Ass'n of Nat'l Adver. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
23. Brown, supra note 22.
24. Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
252, 94 Stat. 374, 378 (codified in part at 15 U.S.C. § 57a(i)) ("The
Commission shall not have any authority to promulgate any rule in children's
advertising proceeding pending on the date of enactment of the Federal Trade
Commission Improvements Act of 1980 or in any substantially similar
proceeding on the basis of a determination by the commission that such adver-
tising constitutes an unfair act or practice in or affecting commerce.").
25. 15 U.S.C. § 57a-l(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
26. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S.
1216 (1983) (summarily affirming the Court of Appeals' striking down of the
legislative veto as unconstitutional in Consumers Union of US., Inc. v. FTC,
691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
27. Brown, supra note 22.
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28and that kids were being deceived. That problem still exists today.
The difficulty was designing a solution to that problem. How do
you craft a law that prohibits advertising to very young children, say
six or seven years old, when those children are mixed in with older
audiences? We considered a regulation that would say, "No ads in
programs aimed at children when a certain percentage of very young
kids are in the audience." 29 The problem was that there was only one
program on television in those days in which fifty percent of the
audience was about six or seven, and that was "Captain Kangaroo."
It would seem ironic to go through three years of struggle and
publish a regulation banning ads on "Captain Kangaroo." That
wouldn't accomplish much.
To affect all advertising on Saturday morning television, we
would have had to drop the percentage of young kids in audiences
down to about nineteen percent. However, that would have banned
ads in all programs in which over eighty percent of audiences would
have been adults and older kids. That seemed overkill. In other
words, we had trouble tailoring a regulation that would prohibit ads
only in programs watched by young children, because it turns out
there aren't any programs just watched by very young children;
audiences are all intermixed together. 30
We were also concerned that if we banned ads to young
children, we might undermine commercial support for those
provisions. In theory, if you had programs (which you don't) which
are only watched by children aged one to six, our remedy would
prohibit sponsorship for those programs. The networks asked,
"What incentive do we have to create such programs?" Now,
privately, I thought the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
could require networks to carry children's programming without ads
as a public service, but nonetheless it posed a difficult problem,
particularly since the FTC couldn't speak for the FCC.
28. FTC, supra note 6, at 90 n.120.
29. Children's Advertising, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,967, 17,969 (Apr. 27, 1978)
(codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 369).
30. See Children's Advertising, 46 Fed. Reg. 49,710, 48,712 (Oct. 2, 1981)
(codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 461) (stating the staff found that the only effective
remedy would be a ban on all advertisements oriented toward young children,
which would be both over- and under-inclusive).
May 2006]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
We also considered a regulation that would prohibit advertising
"aimed at young children,"3' but we didn't know how to define ads
"aimed at young children." How do you define an advertisement
"aimed at" a young child? Intent? Impact?
We considered another concept: no ads in "programs aimed at
young children."' But it turned out that the most popular program
among young children was I Love Lucy, so we would've ended up
banning ads in I Love Lucy but not Saturday morning cartoon shows.
That didn't seem to work either. So we concluded there was a
serious problem, that TV ads did deceive young kids, but we
couldn't draft a regulation that was narrowly tailored enough to
address that particular problem without also affecting ads in
programs seen by many older children and adults.
The second FTC proposal was to ban all ads for sugared
products to older kids, say eight to eleven and up. We concluded,
yes, tooth decay was a major serious health problem.32 The problem
we encountered was defining sugared products. We had trouble
writing a definition for candy. We tried defining products as having
chocolate in them, but it turned out that chocolate had health
benefits. A study from Sweden apparently showed that the more
chocolate you ate, the less tooth decay you had. And remember, we
had to base this regulation on the record, so we struggled with often
counter-intuitive facts. It turned out that some of the most cariogenic
products were not candies but things like dried fruits, because they
stick to the teeth. One of the most cariogenic of all turned out to be
potato chips; they stick to the teeth and are converted into acid
incredibly quickly.
So we struggled. We tried to figure out how to restrict
advertising for cariogenic-related products, yet we had trouble defin-
ing the products that would be covered by the bans. If you have
ideas, that's an issue that's still open.
Third, in some respects the most sweeping remedy was this: we
proposed that with respect to other products, like soft drinks-which
don't immediately cause tooth decay because they go through the
mouth quickly but affect long-term nutrition-the remedy to older
kids was counter-messages. In other words, don't ban the ads but
31. Children's Advertising, 43 Fed. Reg. at 17,969 (codified at 14 C.F.R.
pt. 369).
32. See FTC, supra note 6, at 109-14.
[Vol. 39:79
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require the advertiser to pay for nutritional messages---either a
disclosure in the ad or, more importantly, a full counter
commercial-like the anti-smoking messages in California today.
The problem was that for the FTC to show the necessary
predicate for a rule, we had to show that soft drinks ads were
affecting long-term nutritional attitudes that needed to be corrected
by the counter-ads, and we were unable to demonstrate that those ads
were linked to long-term deceptive nutritional attitudes. I personally
think they were, and I think they are today. But at that point, some
twenty-five years ago, we didn't have enough evidence to establish a
link between, let's say, soft drink ads and long-term nutritional
attitudes, and we therefore had to abandon that remedy. In sum, we
terminated the proceeding primarily for political reasons, but there
were also very difficult substantive problems to overcome, and we
were not quite able to solve them.
What lessons can we draw from this? Well, first there are some
political lessons. We probably should not have bundled all these
remedies into one proceeding, because that flushed out and organized
every potential opponent, who then banded together with other
opponents, raised money, and fought the rulemaking. It would've
been better if we had gone remedy by remedy instead of lumping
them together into one document. As a result, we were opposed by
the cereal industry, the sugar industry, the candy industry, the toy
industry and the broadcast industry. The farmers were against us
because they were raising wheat that was being used in sugared
cereals. We even had the cigarette industry against us. Why?
Although cigarettes weren't being advertised to children, the
cigarette industry was convinced that if we were successful in this
proceeding, they would be next. So they raised all this money to
oppose this rule-making proceeding. They used tactics that really
had never been seen before but now are pretty common.
Is there still a problem? Obviously you think there is, or you
probably all wouldn't be here. I still believe very young children do
not understand the difference between a commercial and a program.
Experts told us, twenty-five years ago, that very young kids couldn't
tell the difference, literally. As they got a little older, they would
say, "Yeah, I can tell the difference." But when pressed, they would
May 2006]
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say, "A commercial is funnier than a program" 33 That showed they
still didn't understand the true difference.
Until kids were six, seven or eight years old, they didn't
understand that they were being sold something for a "commercial
motivation." 34 Kids are, I think, genetically programmed to trust
adults. So, to a very young child, a commercial is an adult authority
figure telling them what's good for them. In those days, the biggest
adult figure to kids in TV ads was Tony the Tiger--deep voice,
clearly an adult who loves children, and he's recommending the best
possible action for kids. So I think this is still a problem.
So what? Same said then, and some say today, that kids don't
buy products, their parents do. Therefore, it doesn't matter if ads
deceive kids because parents make the purchasing and the
consumption decisions. I still have a simple response to that. If
parents are making the decisions, why is the industry spending $15
billion a year advertising to children? Interesting paradox. More
significantly, some argue that if kids are deceived, it's all part of life,
it's part of growing up, advertising just toughens them up. All of us
have learned by being deceived, and as you get older you learn how
to handle deception. My problem with this is that it assumes it's
okay to deceive a child as long as they have a parent. I've never
accepted that. I think deception of children is still fundamentally
wrong and should be illegal regardless whether the child has a parent
or whether the child will grow up.
How about the First Amendment? The simple answer is that the
First Amendment does not protect deceptive speech.35
Would a ban on advertising in children's programming leave us
with no children's programming? This is an interesting political and
commercial question. One answer is yes, it would, because if
nobody's going to pay for such programming, then nobody's going
to put it on. But we do have other options. The FCC could require
broadcasters to carry children's programming free of charge as part
of their statutory "public interest" obligations.36 Congress could give
33. Id. at 88-90 (citation omitted).
34. Children's Advertising, 46 Fed. Reg. at 46,712 (codified at 16 C.F.R.
pt. 461).
5 E.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S.
328 (1986).
36 E.g., 47 U.S.C. 309.
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broadcasters who carried such programming tax credits or tax
subsidies. Or Congress could require free carriage of children's
programming as a trade off for the broadcasters' free use of the
publicly-owned broadcast spectrum. Broadcasters could freely make
money on all their other programming, but with children's
programming they could be required to put it on free. Or Congress
could provide stronger funding for children's programming on public
television. All of these seem be reasonable alternatives to targeting
children with billions of dollars of TV advertising, much of which is
"deceptive" to them.
How about the ban on highly sugared ads? Well, I talked about
the need for further research. And there are still other options. We
could still say that it's deceptive and unfair to advertise sugared
products to children because of the health consequences. We could
then time zone the ads into late evening hours. There might also be a
V-chip solution. For those of you familiar with the V-chip, all
television sets today have the capacity to screen out programming
that's coded as excessively sexual or violent. What if we added a
code for sugar or for certain forms of nutritionally harmful
advertising that would be blocked by the V-chip? Parents could
simply program their V-chip and it would automatically black out
every TV commercial selling a product that had more than a certain
percentage of sugar or that was ranked as not nutritional. That's
another possibility.
Finally, how about counter advertising? I still think that for
older children affirmative messages on health and nutrition are very
important, and there are very few places they will ever see such
messages. The question is, who's going to pay for them? There are
really only four options. Advertisers could pay for them-that was
the FTC proposal, which was not adopted. Broadcasters could pay
for them-that was the theory of the old fairness doctrine, requiring
broadcasters to present both sides of controversial issues.
37
Consumers could pay for them-Congress could levy a fee on
specified sugary products and use that money to pay for affirmative
nutritional messages. That's the approach California takes with
cigarette advertising. It levies a fee on cigarettes and spends the
money on anti-smoking announcements. Finally, the government
37 E.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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could pay for nutritional messages for children out of its general
revenues.
The FTC's children's television rulemaking proceeding raised
some fundamental issues that are still confront us today and are
posed by this conference. One of them is the extent to which
children in our society should be treated as consumers. If we're
going to treat very young children as consumers, then I suppose logic
demands that we advertise to them. If we're not going to treat them
as consumers, then we need to create ways of shielding them from
advertising until they're mature enough to understand it.
Put another way, if we were to start all over and recreate our
current system of television and other forms of marketing, say in
creating a system of digital television, would we want to make sure
that our children all see at least 20,000 to 40,000 ads a year? Would
we consciously build that into our system of television? I think we
would not, but that's the system we now in fact have. So, since we
now have it, and we would not have designed it in the first place,
what should we do to correct it? That's still a critically important
question.
I thought about this when my son was in kindergarten-he's
now in college, so that's a while ago. I spent some time sitting in his
kindergarten class, watching the process, and I liked what the teacher
was doing. Most of what the teacher was doing I thought was
terrific. Occasionally I thought, "Well, I'm not sure I would teach
kindergarten that way," but if you go and watch a kindergarten class,
which deals with very young children, I think you will conclude that
the institution of kindergarten is designed for the benefit of the child.
That is its intentionality; that is its purpose; it's there for the benefit
of the child. But if you watch most television aimed at children, I
doubt you could conclude that the advertising and programming is
there for the benefit of the child. It's clearly there for the benefit of
the sponsors. So, we have one set of institutions that are designed to
nurture and help children as they grow older, and we have another
completely different institution that's designed to sell them products
and to inculcate them into lifetime purchasing habits. That's a
fundamental problem in our consumer society, and one we still have
to grapple with.
[Vol. 39:79
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I believe there are solutions to the problems of children's
television advertising, and that these solutions are both constitutional
and legal. It is the purpose of this conference to try and propose,
analyze and debate these solutions. I wish you the best of luck in
doing so.
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